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Abstract 
 
Given recent political tension between political parties in both the United States and 
Argentina, there has been an increased demand for improved and more accurate congressional 
representation, specifically women’s substantive representation in Congress. As the first nation 
to institute a legislative candidate gender quota law, Argentina has been the leading Latin 
American nation to confront anti-feminist politics. Under the cupo de ley femenino, the quota 
mandate of 1991, all major political parties and certain governments cabinets in Argentina are 
required to fill a set thirty percent of positions on party candidate lists with women (Ley No 
24.012). Whereas in the United States, there is no requirement for representation by gender, and 
as of 2016 women occupied twenty percent of each congressional house. Researchers have 
presented new and debated theories regarding the quality of congresswomen’s representation in 
various government systems following the introduction of quota laws around the world. 
Although Argentine female politicians fill a third of seats in both lower and upper congressional 
houses, they are often perceived as political pawns to male party leaders who seek total 
obedience from women whom they would not have otherwise elected (Zetterberg). In the United 
States, researchers are concerned by women’s legislative impact as a marginalized minority. In 
this thesis I examine whether or not these contrasting systems in the US and Argentina achieve 
similar feminist progress through increased representation over the past thirty years. Just like 
Aesop’s fable “The Tortoise and the Hare,” I hypothesize that through its quota laws, Argentina 
has made great strides by introducing the cupo de ley, however has since stopped its progress. In 
contrast, I expect the United States to make steady, but sluggish (or rather tortoise-like) 
advancement of women’s representation. I will then use these findings to answer the question: in 
the race to gender equality in politics, who will win? 
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I 
Introduction 
As the first nation to institute a legislative candidate gender quota law, Argentina has 
been the forerunner in Latin American feminist politics. Under the cupo de ley femenino, the 
quota mandate that was introduced in 1991, parties and certain governments cabinets are 
required to fill a set thirty percent of positions on party candidate lists with women (Ley No 
24.012). Researchers have presented new and debated theories regarding the quality of 
congresswomen’s representation in politics following the introduction of these quotas. Although 
Argentine female politicians fill a third of seats in both lower and upper congressional houses, 
they are often perceived as political pawns to male party leaders who seek total obedience from 
women whom they would not have otherwise elected (Zetterberg). According to researchers 
Franceschet and Piscopo (2008), congresswomen under quota laws have also been depicted as 
victims of sexism more than those in non-quota nations. As a result, they potentially face greater 
obstacles when attempting to effectively introduce and pass legislation. In this thesis I studied 
whether or not these allegations are true by comparing the cases of Argentina and the United 
States. 
Previous studies on Argentine legislators suggest two theories: 1) that gender quota laws 
have enhanced women’s presence in Congress but do not resolve issues regarding women’s 
substantive representation; and 2) that the quota has greatly increased the number of introduced 
bills on women’s interests but not the amount of those passed. Together, these results provide a 
theoretical framework upon which I tested my claims.  
I hypothesized that, while Argentina’s cupo de ley femenino has improved women’s 
descriptive representation (i.e. their presence in congress) and substantive representation as a 
process (i.e. their participation in legislation), the gender quota has not impacted legislative 
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outcome or advanced congresswomen’s agenda concerning women’s interests. In fact, I suggest 
that in contrast to the United States’ slow and steady increase in women’s representation, 
women’s substantive representation in Argentina has stagnated both as a process and as an 
outcome due to the fast-track structure of quota laws. Just like Aesop’s fable “The Tortoise and 
the Hare,” I claimed that Argentina has made great strides by introducing the cupo de ley, 
however has since stopped its progress as the United States makes the steady, but sluggish (or 
rather tortoise-like) advancement of women’s representation. I used these findings to answer the 
question: in the race to gender equality in politics, who will win?  
Theoretical Framework 
In analyzing the efficiency of quota laws, I draw on two literatures: descriptive and 
substantive representation as well as critical mass theory. Descriptive representation, as shown 
by women’s presence and image in Congress, is crucial in creating the political environment to 
foster substantive representation—women’s legislative participation and hopefully success. In 
order to obtain this descriptive representation, researchers Kanter (1977) Childs and Krook 
(2009) conclude that there must be a certain number of women present in Congress. This 
number—approximately thirty percent of legislators—is defined as a critical mass; by reaching 
this number, Kanter claims that women’s descriptive representation reaches the point where it 
inspires greater substantive representation. Once women’s occupancy in government reaches a 
critical mass of 30%, critical mass theory suggests that there is not just a subsequent growth of 
women’s bills, but also in passed legislation (Tremblay 2006, 504).  
Case Selection  
Studies of Argentine gender quota laws and women’s political representation emphasize 
the structural sexism and limitations put on congresswomen’s ability to impact policy. Similarly, 
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American research on female legislators indicates a slow rise in their presence in Congress, 
however women still struggle to climb the political ladder by leading congressional committees 
and elite circles (Beckwith 2012). My study compares Argentina and the United States because 
they’ve each led the way in congresswomen’s political development in the Americas and use 
different methods to improve women’s representation, with varying results. I formed a most-
similar, different-outcomes comparison in which these two very different cases face hindrances 
that affect the dependent variables of women’s success and substantive representation in 
Congress. Whereas women in Argentina’s Congress used quota laws to create an outcome in 
descriptive representation, the United States focused on the goal of improving women’s 
substantive representation. By contrasting their struggles towards gender equity, I evaluate the 
effectiveness of their differing independent variables: women’s presence in congress, critical 
mass, and even women’s legislative participation. A comparison between these two nations is 
crucial to gender studies in politics because it offers insight into women’s political advancement 
and the reasons behind the separate obstacles they face in Argentina and the US.  
Globally, women often identify structural sexism and gendered exclusion as the culprit of 
our nation’s lack of female representation in legislation and the executive branch (Zetterberg). 
Although we have yet to see a sharp increase or change in women’s representation in the United 
States, the quality of women’s contribution to politics is not explicitly questioned as it is in 
Argentina because of the US’ lack of a quota. Argentina’s barricade on further progress is the 
result of male legislators and the public’s concern that in quota nations women’s achievements 
are accredited to the quota law rather than the female legislators’ own merits. I have yet to find a 
case selection which compares both cases. Through conducting my research, I expect evidence 
of a gradual but continuous growth in American women’s representation compared to 
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Argentina’s fast-tracked, but since stagnated numbers. I analyzed discursos and records from the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union to see changes in congresswomen’s presence and policy from 1983 to 
2016 in both countries. I also surveyed American and Argentine reports gauging women’s 
political progress in each country’s congress over these time periods.  
Hypothesis 
 I hypothesized that the United States, despite its long and steady rise in feminism and 
women’s representation, is still highly gendered in its politics. I researched to see if the 
American standard for congresswomen is a paradox in that women struggle to appear feminine 
and successful in a characteristically male-dominated field. The presumed explanation for this 
struggle is that femininity (wherein women are defined as soft, meek, and personable) is 
incompatible to also be viewed as a good politician (i.e. bold, assertive, masculine, which is in 
turn detrimental to their image as a woman). I theorize that this slows but does not deter political 
progress. Its influence is due to the cultural, contradictory concept of the ideal female politician. 
Ultimately, it stands as a sexist fallacy for women.  
My second hypothesis is that Argentina, in acknowledging its lack of modernity due to its 
deep-seated sexism, uses quota laws as a fast-track to creating a critical mass of female 
legislators. However, this will only function when male politicians cooperate. I postulate that 
women’s descriptive representation under the quota laws is used by male legislators to reach the 
quota and appease feminist demands without dedicating their focus to further improving 
women’s representation in Congress. By fast-tracking a critical mass via quotas, Argentina has 
legally supported women’s legislative participation, but has yet to cultivate an environment that 
fosters their success as congresswomen. Rather, it has caused evident stagnation and the 
prevention of long term progress for female politicians in Argentina. Through further research, I 
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sought to show this stagnation as an inevitable consequence of Argentina’s quota design. In a 
country where women make great strides in Congress but are defined by their traditional gender 
roles, congresswomen are seen as holding more domestic (and non-public) responsibilities. If 
constrained by this stereotype, it is impossible for female legislators to install a successful 
system that doesn’t incentivize the public or male policy-makers to continue to exclude women 
from powerful political positions.  
Even with quotas, Argentina as a whole still faces institutional and cultural barriers that 
obstruct women’s advancement in legislature. While these roadblocks have slowly been phased 
out of American culture and politics, Argentina cannot be expected to instantaneously change its 
cultural and political worldviews to adapt to the cupo de ley. Furthermore, I hypothesized that 
now matter how much Argentina modernizes, the quota law cannot successfully improve 
women’s substantive representation under a system where political parties and incumbent male 
legislators don’t benefit by losing their seats to women. 
Outline 
 The following chapters consist of the literature review, methodology and empirical 
studies in the cases of Argentina and the United States, profiles of their feminist and political 
history, the data analysis of each country, and finally my research analysis and conclusion. 
Throughout each section, I presented the argument that the United States without a quota law has 
slowly reached its critical mass of women representatives in politics to gain considerable 
substantive representation, which I concluded is the goal and deciding factor in women’s success 
and proper inclusion in politics. Furthermore, I argued that if more women entered US 
legislature, this would only improve congresswomen’s agenda and influence in policy-making, 
even without a quota. However, when analyzing my comparative research on Argentina’s cupo 
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de ley, I showed in my retelling of Argentine history and my research product that the quota’s 
design—not the quota itself—is the culprit for the nation’s stagnation in representation. 
Although Argentina has made much faster progress in the same time as the US and was much 
quicker in obtaining critical mass, I concluded that Argentine women have since hit a wall that 
American legislators did not face in their shared goal to improve women’s representation.  
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II 
Literature Review  
Quota Laws 
 For centuries, women have struggled to gain political representation. First by fighting for 
superficial, descriptive representation and inclusion in politics, and then by demanding 
substantial substantive representation that would translate into political influence and impact 
policy. Before analyzing women’s representation and critical mass theory in regards to the cupo 
de ley femenino, it is necessary to understand the history and structure of the quota laws 
themselves. They first emerged in Pakistan in 1954 and contributed to the Western second-wave 
feminist movement beginning in the 1960s. Despite this progress, the global average of female 
representation in parliament then stabilized and remained largely unaffected. At present, 
women’s political representation continues to vary between ten and fifteen percent worldwide 
(Krook 2003, 3). Following the boom in national gender quotas in the 1990s, many activists and 
policymakers have since questioned the validity of gender quotas in their ability to effectively 
improve women’s representation. In understanding the various quota systems and the conditions 
in which they are applied, analysts may venture to answer the question: Do quota laws truly 
work? 
How Quotas Were Introduced 
The initial gender quotas were set in Pakistan following the nation’s independence and 
transition to democracy in 1947. Political unrest and tensions between eastern and western 
Pakistan led to women’s increased involvement in political movements and the 1954 elections 
that installed the first ever gender quota law (IPU 2015b). It, along with subsequent laws in 
Bangladesh and in local Indian governments, simply required that legislators reserve a certain 
amount of seats for women (Krook 2003, 26). However, many other nations modified quotas 
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either via constitutional or electoral laws, or by forcing political parties to adhere to rules set by 
partisan gender quotas.  
The first successful case of gender quota systems was in Norway in 1975, which further 
spurred the second feminist wave that began in the 60s and encouraged other Nordic states to 
consider improving women’s political representation. Unlike newly established or unstable 
democracies, the introduction of gender quota systems in Norway was not simply a result of 
women’s protest to their marginalization as a group. It had become a strategic and progressive 
move by governments. Women’s progress in Norway inspired movements across the globe, 
including Africa’s first quota law in Uganda in 1986 and Latin America’s first use of a quota by 
Argentina in 1991 (Rande & Ford 2011). In the case of Uganda, the quotas were introduced as a 
direct result of the nation’s return to democracy after periods of oppression and genocide under 
Milton Obote and then military dictator Idi Amin. Similarly, South Africa witnessed its first 
gender quota immediately post-apartheid in 1994. This pattern emerged in Latin America as 
well, where Argentina and ten other nations installed various quota laws after overthrowing 
military juntas that had ruled for decades. However, these quotas were not simply applied top-
down by governments, but were heavily dependent on women’s grassroots activism and 
solidarity as a marginalized group. Seeing as sexism (particularly in politics) still exists 
regardless of a quota, the quota law itself does not reduce women’s discrimination, but creates a 
system in which women may address the barriers set for them in political representation. Rather, 
it is the design of a quota system’s electoral system that effectively tackles the obstacles women 
face in government. 
In response to either political unrest or women’s activism, gender quotas gained global 
attention and legitimacy by 1990 with the United Nations’ adoption of a quota law in their 
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Economic and Social Council. It demanded action with its target for women’s representation to 
reach a critical mass of thirty percent in all decision-making bodies worldwide by 1995. Even in 
the Middle East, where culture and certain statutes restrict women’s participation, there are 
exceptions in Tunisia, Morocco, Palestine, Jordan and Egypt where women are reserved seats in 
certain councils (Rande & Ford 2011). As was the case in the Middle East and Northern Africa, 
quotas were increasingly used because of government’s pressure from international organizations 
or from cross-country models that were already successful. These cases provide strong evidence 
as to why quota laws came about and what prompts countries to use them. Although these 
nations differ in cultural history and economic development, their various quota systems serve to 
combat each country’s discrimination and address their women’s need for representation.  
How Gender Quotas Work 
According to ML Krook (2003), a gender quota system’s function and effectiveness 
depends on four characteristics: 1) the mandate’s origin, be it by law, constitution, or partisan; 2) 
the force with which it is implemented and upheld; 3) when in the election process the quota is 
introduced; and 4) the ways in which legislators “attempt to reform the dynamics of candidate 
selection,” (Allen, Cutts, and Campbell 2014, 144). These aspects determine which quota design 
is used, and three systems of origin that have been developed thus far: voluntary quotas, 
candidate lists, and lastly the reserved seat system. 
i. Voluntary Quotas 
 Political party quotas (otherwise known as voluntary quotas) are not enacted by any 
constitutional or legislative decision but are self-installed by political parties. Partisan groups 
voluntarily construct candidate lists to include a certain percentage of women, either applying a 
gender quota on just their primary candidate lists or also on all seats the party will occupy post-
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election. Political party quotas are the most popular design and represent a majority of quota 
systems (Dahlerup 2006). They make up over 60% of all national gender quota laws and are used 
mostly in Europe (Pande & Ford 2011). For example, the United Kingdom voluntarily constructs 
All-Women Lists to register female candidates on all party electoral lists. In accordance with 
Dahlerup’s classifications, the UK’s system is a) of partisan origin; b) voluntary; c) upheld by 
each party throughout the election process; and is a d) majoritarian, first-past-the-post (FPTP) 
electoral system, therefore it is filtered and reformed by single-member districts (Krook 2003, 
14).  
 European parliaments in particular have used political party quotas to increase women’s 
representation. As early as 2003, women’s representation reached thirty-two percent in Germany 
and over thirty-six percent in both Norway and the Netherlands (Dahlerup & Freidenvall 2011, 
43). However, other Nordic countries that share a similar history and level of development 
maintain an “explicit disavowal of quotas in favor of political party targets, [which still] 
increased women’s representation to 45% in Sweden [and] 38% in Denmark,” (Krook 2003, 3).  
ii. Legislative Quotas  
As implied, Legislative or constitutional quota laws are a constitutional or legislative 
mandate that requires a certain portion of positions on candidate lists to be reserved for women. 
38% of quota systems consist of mandates, spanning across Europe and particularly Latin 
America (IPU 2015a). Constitutional and electoral laws in Argentina increased women’s 
representation in congress by over 30% and forced parties to provide more female candidates for 
upcoming elections. Still, results vary greatly by country. For example, France enacted a 30% 
quota that was 1) legislative and; 2) installed in candidate party lists; 3) but it did not have to be 
upheld in elected seats, which 4) did “not lead to greater female representation… because party 
  14 
elites have simply not followed the quota regulation,” (Krook 2003, 4). Whereas voluntary quota 
laws have increased women’s descriptive representation in certain countries like Spain, the force 
with which and time in which the quota was installed in France did not effectively enforce the 
quota. By superficially promoting but not guaranteeing the election of women to office, the 
French quota system became largely unsuccessful, at its peak having just 26.9% of seats held by 
women (Dahlerup, Freidenvall, and Johansson 2013, 7). 
Despite both Spain and France using legislation to demand the election of female 
politicians now dubbed ‘quota women,’ legislative and constitutional mandates allow 
parliaments to repossess and reserve important positions for men (Allen, Cutts, and Campbell 
2014, 145). Meanwhile they designate peripheral roles for women, or simply ensure that they 
meet the quota by nominating them but do not actually elect them. The French nominee 
system—along with every other form of quota introduction—has been met with varying levels of 
acceptance and success by women and politicians alike. Most notably, with legislative quotas it 
is not explicitly stated where these women must be listed so that “groups who are affected 
adversely—male incumbents, party leaders and firm owners—respond strategically in order to 
reduce the impact of gender quotas on leadership outcomes,” (Pande & Ford 2011, 3). Therefore, 
when either national governments or parties do include women, elite members and party leaders 
often disregard the quality of women’s representation once the quota has been met. This often 
leaves women in countries like France and Argentina stuck at the bottom of their party’s 
candidate lists. Regardless of the origin and means in which women are placed in the political 
system, they are for the most part ignored.  
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iii. Reserved Seat Quotas 
 Reserved seat systems are also constitutional or legislative mandates. However, instead 
of reserving a certain percentage of previously male positions for women, they create positions 
for which only women are allowed to run. In theory, this design for quotas should effectively 
impact women’s descriptive representation while also gradually changing male legislator 
attitudes towards congresswomen. Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that the public 
responds similarly. According to Pande and Ford (2011), both male legislators and “voters’ 
implicit attitudes and willingness to vote for women are strongly and positively changed by 
persistent exposure to female leaders,” (26). Unfortunately, only 20% of quota laws are reserved 
seat systems, and they are often in regions of Africa and Asia where women are restricted in their 
rights to impact policy and even public life (10). Still, select countries like Iraq and Nepal have 
successfully introduced women into the political sphere where they fill over 25% of seats (IPU 
2015a). While reserved seats allow policy makers (read male legislators) to regulate the number 
of women elected, the other two types of quotas do not set a ceiling on the number or types of 
positions that women may hold. With all forms of quota laws, nations across the world have 
applied different systems and have witnessed varying results, indicating that a quota’s success 
depends on its proper use of a gender quota (as either Proportional Representation or FPTP), not 
the nation’s cultural history, economic stability, level of development, or even quota system.  
 Upon analysis it seems that often all quotas face certain obstacles in each country, faring 
better in certain environments than others. Studies indicate that nations have more easily 
introduced quotas when applied to proportional representation systems (PR) over majoritarian 
systems (FPTP) that work under single-member districts (Dahlerup 2003). There are two main 
explanations for this. First, PR systems (either by law or by partisan) make political parties 
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support the adoption of candidate gender quotas in their lists throughout multi-member districts 
(2003, 14). Whether the lists are open or closed, parties are forced to nominate women across 
district and party lines in all electoral positions, as opposed to single-member districts. As a 
result, PR systems have proven to produce greater representation of women compared to those 
first-past-the-post. However, it is extremely important if the party list is open or not. With closed 
lists, “proportion and placement matter: these lists increase female representation if women are 
placed near the top, but not if they are placed near the bottom of the list,” as is seen throughout 
many Latin American nations (Krook 2003, 14).  
 Using open party lists, women’s representation is more proportionate but dependent on 
their party leader’s choice, where the party boss may methodically vote for men before women. 
In nations with mandatory legislative quotas, male politicians and the public alike blame 
international pressures and female legislators for women’s incorporation into congress and 
leadership positions. They claim that quotas further engender and muddy the already centralized 
candidate selection process. In these normalized procedures, party leaders (who are often men) 
are now forced to meet the quota by handpicking women and turning away male colleagues. As a 
result, PR systems in general do not guarantee an increase in women’s representation, but it does 
force partisan groups to recruit female candidates and at least superficially promote gender 
equality. In contrast, majoritarian, single-member districts face worse opposition in that FPTP 
systems “imply a zero-sum game (if a woman is selected, a man is not), [so] the chance to 
‘balance’ nominations is all but impossible.” (Krook 2003, 15). This is further demonstrated by 
recent studies indicating that the nations with the highest levels of women’s representation are 
those with proportional representation electoral systems, not necessarily those with a certain type 
of quota (IPU 2015b).  
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How Gender Quotas Compare to No Quota 
In both quota and non-quota nations, women worldwide have succeeded in gaining 
representation but still struggle to win support. Although they have similar experience and 
education as both their male counterparts and non-quota women in legislature, ‘quota women’ 
are often labeled as ineffective placeholders, unlike their male colleagues or non-quota 
congresswomen. Politicians and voters alike repeatedly resist the enforcement of quota laws on 
the grounds that the women elected under them are political pawns or ‘mujeres de’ (Krook 2003, 
14). Those opposed to the quota also believe that targeting gender inequity dilutes candidate 
pools and replaces eligible male parliamentarians with less qualified women (Murray 2012, 27). 
However, the caliber of any legislator, male or female, actually lies in the hands of executive 
positions with true legislative and political power. Seeing as quota women have consistently 
shown equal potential and voting tendencies than non-quota women, it seems that female 
legislators as a group excel in politics as long as they hold the same influence as their male 
counterparts (Allen, Cutts, and Campbell 2014, 146).  
Unfortunately, as quota women are often accused by government parties and electorates 
as being unqualified or malleable, governments are continually critical of female candidates’ 
legitimacy. They are viewed as being untrustworthy and easily swayed by emotion and male 
influence, although it has been shown that “quota women are no more likely to suffer from 
tokenism, marginalization or invisibilisation than other women legislators,” (Zetterberg 2009, 
455). In analyzing the factors associated with gender quotas such as descriptive and substantive 
representation as well as critical mass theory, researchers may more easily address controversy 
surrounding the standard for female politicians, with and without gender quota laws. 
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As the number of gender quotas increases worldwide, perhaps research will indicate that through 
time quota women’s added experience “increases effectiveness of women political leaders and 
can result in efficiency gains for the constituency through female representatives” (Pande & Ford 
2011, 25). 
Descriptive and Substantive Women’s Representation 
“Quotas ideally deepen the descriptive representation of women as a group and the substantive 
representation of women’s group interests,” (Piscopo 2011, 448). 
 
As gender quotas dictate that female politicians are required to fill a certain amount of 
seats rather than winning office without the quota’s support, ‘quota women’ face greater 
obstacles to get elected and pass legislation. According to numerous studies on congresswomen 
in quota states, researchers have suggested a distinct divergence in women politicians’ 
representation. Studies suggest that although gender quota laws enhanced women’s presence (or 
descriptive representation) in politics, they did not necessarily improve women’s substantive 
representation—the rendering of women’s power to participate in and influence legislature. This 
difference between agenda-driven substantive representation and descriptive representation 
(based on demographic backgrounds) provide a theoretical framework. Distinguishing between 
the two is imperative to understanding the democratic outcome of quota laws and their 
effectiveness concerning congresswomen’s political agenda. 
Descriptive Representation 
Women’s descriptive representation in legislation— the number of women in Congress—
has created “both opportunities for and potential obstacles to [their] substantive representation 
(the promotion of women’s interests),” (Franceschet & Piscopo 2008, 1). Although descriptive 
representation is both rising and maintained by quotas, the occlusive collaborations between 
male counterparts reinforce the exclusion of women from policy making. Furthermore, the 
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gender-specific committee systems in some quota governments blatantly designate women to 
staying in social and community-based councils. The nuanced networking used in legislative 
committees set behavioral norms and expectations for women politicians with newer, seemingly 
progressive (but separate) groups. In doing so, legislators are only setting new glass ceilings. In 
systems where women must disregard committee arrangements to raise awareness of gender 
bias, descriptive representation shapes legislators’ shared identity as women and “captures the 
deliberate and persuasive arguments that construct group interests,” (Piscopo 2011, 452). The 
sheer presence of women, along with their declaration as a disadvantaged but united minority, 
strengthens their chances of policy change as a group and allows for better substantive progress. 
Therefore, descriptive representation (in order to effectively trigger substantive representation) is 
not simply the number of women in Congress. It is also congresswomen’s shared obligation to 
stand up for women as a group; their image as activists provides information to male legislators 
and the public about women’s issues to promote feminist interests.  
However, these congresswomen cannot let their identities as representatives of women 
overshadow their other policies, or else they risk losing their validity as successful legislators. 
Balancing these roles as female politicians, congresswomen are neither “the cipher of universal 
womanhood nor the embodiment of all possible womanhoods. Rather, [they] render an aspect of 
‘being female’ relevant to current political discussions, providing generalized information about 
women’s experiences, concerns or needs,” (Piscopo 2011, 451). In order to be a catalyst for 
change, female legislators must first demonstrate that their roles as champions to women are 
only a component of their political agenda. As women’s congressional presence and activism 
expands, so too should their image as competent legislators aside from women’s interests. 
Ultimately, descriptive representation as congresswomen’s presence serves to advance their 
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“portrayals of constituents’ circumstances,” and act as a bridge to more significant improvement 
in substantive representation (448). 
Piscopo defines these two aspects of descriptive representation as distinct factors that 
must coexist in order for women to be as effective as their male counterparts. They must a) 
increase their numbers in order to reach critical mass so that they can b) capitalize on their 
platform to promote women while acting as politicians. This should in turn spur policy change 
and form outlets for them to succeed and advance their political career (i.e. substantive progress). 
In measuring descriptive improvements to women’s agency, female legislators must first show 
their willingness to serve as representatives of a group’s collective identity, concern’s and 
interests in society. To do so, congresswomen must create a cohesive agenda as women 
politicians to collaborate their group’s ideas into innovative and effective policies (i.e. 
substantive change). Only then can women achieve their goals of equal representation. 
 Research on women’s legislative representation all presents a common theme: effective 
representation demands that women have a) diversity and inclusion throughout the political 
sphere; b) openness amongst other women and a shared identity as a group; and lastly c) a 
feminist agenda that serves to benefit women through policy change (Manning, Brudnick, and 
Shogan 2015). Congresswomen’s presence and image is a superficial but very important form of 
representation. Piscopo defines it as descriptive representation “wherein minorities’ inclusion in 
the legislature becomes emblematic of the political system’s legitimacy and other traits,” 
(Piscopo 2011, 448). Statistics like these portray quota nations as progressive and allows quota 
women to showcase themselves as good examples and a crucial part of women’s advancement as 
a whole. For this reason, it is imperative that these congresswomen are not interchangeable or 
viewed simply as women; they must present themselves as a diverse group with a unique 
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perspective and contribution to legislature. Archenti explains that there is a need for women 
“with different origins and social membership in decision-making” in order to assert women’s 
legitimacy and agency in politics (2011, 135). In order to avoid claims of being pawns in a 
predominantly masculine political network, women must validate their views by representing 
both their sex and their party, successfully balancing the two identities of politicians and 
minority members.  
Substantive Representation 
In order to further women’s representation and achieve substantive influence in Congress, 
female legislators must overcome the sexist structures that keep them from impacting policy. 
Modern sexism theory indicates that while fewer people endorse hostile, old-fashioned 
prejudicial beliefs, they still do not support gender equality in their actions, attitude or ideologies 
(Swim, Aikin, Hall, and Hunter 1995, 199). The barriers women face when entering politics are 
defined as less of an overt aggression against women, but rather an ambivalent, underlying 
rejection of furthering gender equality. Much like modern sexism, Dr. David Sears of UCLA 
identified the characteristics of modern racism against African-Americans “as being a) denial of 
continuing discrimination; b) antagonism toward African-Americans’ demands; and c) 
resentment toward special favors for African-Americans,” (Sears & Henry 2005, 200). Similarly, 
the substantive representation and perceptions of women politicians haven’t improved because of 
(not despite) the increase in descriptive representation. Due to a quota law’s requirements that 
women be present in legislature, women face the problem of men denying the need for further 
progress in the quality of women’s representation. As men choose to antagonize the quota law’s 
mandate, feminist agendas are stalled and female politicians are resented for occupying men’s 
seats in parliament. Some legislators don’t believe that measures should be taken to support 
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women’s empowerment or agency in legislature because the preventative laws are in place; nor 
do they think that feminist movements hold much weight in today’s world. Men in legislature 
and the public rationalize their sexism by claiming that they live in a modern society where 
women no longer face prejudice and are already represented. The existence of a quota law is 
used as evidence for the modern sexist’s case, ironically to women’s detriment. As opposed to 
old-fashioned sexism, modern sexism is more ambivalent in nature. It is subtler and more 
socially accepted, thus proving difficult to discourage as women’s descriptive representation is 
increasing but their substantive representation is not (Swim, Aikin, Hall, and Hunter 1995, 222). 
In addition to modern sexism theory, women’s substantive representation is also stunted 
by the delegation of female politicians’ legislative roles to topics of women’s interests, the “more 
fundamental, related to major gendered cleavages, social structures, and institutions,” (Beckwith 
2012, 20). Whereas women’s interests can be used to unify women as a source for mobilization 
and empowerment in women’s issues, it is arguable that women’s interests in legislature have 
pushed them into the political periphery. It seems that labeling women’s interests delegates 
women to strictly social, gendered issues like reproductive rights. If congresswomen cannot use 
their descriptive representation to unite and promote their legitimacy in and outside of women’s 
issues, their role as politicians diminishes and restricts them from major policies such as national 
security, economic issues, etc. The lack of female politicians in authoritative public office 
positions serves “to suppress women’s political participation and the factors that inform and 
enrich it,” (Beckwith 2012, 22). The resentment of the quota laws (because of its forced 
descriptive representation of female legislators) has been detrimental to these women’s 
substantive representation. Quota women are isolated and referred to as mujeres de or “‘women 
of [a man],’ that is, partners or relatives of male party leaders,” (Franceschet & Piscopo 2008, 9).   
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In the case of quota nations, regardless of women’s descriptive representation, 
stateswomen are impacted by their substantive representation as a process. Unlike substantive 
representation as an outcome, as a process women are able to actively participate in politics. The 
outcome of passing legislation hopefully serves as evidence of women’s legitimacy in politics, 
thus establishing women’s representation and future gender equality. However, substantive 
representation as a process does not guarantee its success as policy outcome or the passing of 
their legislation. It simply allows women the opportunity to present their case through debates 
and bill proposals rather than ensuring the success of women’s policies. Although the process 
differs from non-quota countries’ improvements on female politician’s representation, every 
state struggles with democratic concerns addressed by the same schools of thought. These 
theoretical underpinnings include a) critical mass theory; b) women’s double bind; and c) 
resentment of paternalism and its label and mandate effects. 
Critical Mass Theory 
A crucial factor to gender equality is determining the point at which women’s descriptive 
representation in Congress is most effective in gaining substantive representation. In other 
words, calculating the critical mass for the number of women in Congress is vital in helping 
congresswomen understand the gendered environment they face in politics. Critical mass theory 
serves as a formula to see how many women must be elected to Congress in order to react how 
women act and are perceived in legislature. This cause and effect relationship between critical 
mass and women’s representation differs between quota and non-quota states and provides a 
theoretical framework for women’s legislative behavior and the outcome they can have on 
politics.  
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Recent analyses indicate that critical mass theory is evolving. It was first introduced by 
Everett Rogers in his socioeconomic text Diffusion of Innovations in 1962, then it was applied to 
Gender Studies when first researching quota laws. Critical mass theory proposes that “women 
are unlikely to have an impact until they grow from a few token individuals into a considerable 
minority, or ‘critical mass,’ of all legislators,” (Childs & Krook 2009, 126). Since then, Dr. 
Rosabeth Kanter has discredited this idea, arguing that critical actors— “those who act 
individually or collectively to bring about women-friendly policy change”—successfully 
implement progress, not critical mass. Rather than emphasizing simply the amount of women in 
politics, studying critical actors focuses on women legislators’ autonomy, interdependence, and 
coordinated mobilization as a group. (Childs & Krook 2009, 136). Further research also indicates 
that critical mass is not infallible and that a dramatic change in people’s attitudes and actions 
regarding sex discrimination must change.  
In the case of Western congresswomen, cross national findings broadly support the 
notion that proportional representation systems result in an increase in female representation 
(Hinojosa 2012, 187), therefore it is assumed that proportional representation “as a device that 
tends to safeguard minority rights, can also promote women’s involvement in politics,” (Swers 
2005, 103). Data from case studies in quota nations, however, indicate that an increase in 
women’s descriptive representation directly decreases women’s substantive representation as an 
outcome. Although substantive representation as a process—the participation of women in 
Congress—has continued to rise with the increase in number of female legislators, it lessens as 
an outcome due to women’s augmented input, making “approval of gender-related legislation 
less likely, especially when a woman sponsors the bill,” (Htun, Lacalle & Micozzi 2013, 97). 
Therefore, although critical mass theory suggests that more women always leads to more 
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representation, reaching critical mass can also trigger a negative backlash to women’s increased 
political participation. Studies by the Journal of Politics in Latin America note that “the 
coefficient for [the critical mass] threshold is positive and highly significant. These coefficients 
support the intuition that boosting women’s presence is likely to improve processes of legislative 
behavior regarding women’s rights,” (108). However, any stagnation in women’s representation 
following the use of quota laws would question the validity of critical mass theory. It presents 
the question: if women reach critical mass in Congress but still struggle to obtain substantive 
representation, what force is suspending their further progress? And how can critical actors 
resolve the issue? 
Dr. Drude Dahlerup most recently asserted that Kanter’s concept of critical actors, 
although an improvement upon critical mass theory, inaccurately suggests that critical mass 
matters less than the sole efforts of a select group. Dahlerup expands upon Kanter’s theory by 
stating that incentives for change are dependent on critical acts, or mechanisms that ‘change the 
position of the minority and lead to further changes,” (Dahlerup 1988, 275). Critical acts rely on 
more than simple numbers or select individuals. The key to critical acts is “the willingness and 
ability of the minority to mobilize the resources of the organization or institution to improve the 
situation for themselves and the whole minority group,” (Childs & Krook 2009, 129). Just as 
descriptive representation is more than simply women’s presence, critical mass is more than a 
number. It requires moments of progress brought on by either numbers or people who can create 
crucial acts to bring about change. Childs and Krook conclude that “there still may be a place for 
the concept of critical mass—but not critical mass theory—in studies of women’s legislative 
behavior. This is because critical actors, as we define them, are those who either initiate reforms 
themselves or play a central role in mobilizing” decisive movements for policy change (Childs & 
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Krook 2009, 145).  As a result, quota laws (as the enforcer of critical mass theory) might 
increase the likelihood of critical actors as well as acts, however they do not necessarily 
guarantee better substantive representation than feminist policies applied in non-quota nations.  
Women’s “Double Bind” 
 Regardless of a country’s quota laws or critical mass, researchers find that all women in 
politics face criticism and issues of substantive representation due to what is called a double 
bind. Under this pretext, female politicians face conflicting images as policymakers and as 
women—they must balance their identity as women with the previously considered incompatible 
role as a politician. Forced to balance the qualities of their sex with those of their profession, this 
double bind presents the issue that congresswomen are perceived as weak or ineffectual 
legislators because they are women. 
 In response to women’s struggle to balance these roles, Dahlerup (2006) argues that 
congresswomen’s activity and critical acts as a group—not their presence or critical mass—
weakens gender stereotypes like the double-bind to further representation in politics. The 
reasoning behind this is that their actions as an underrepresented minority, not their numbers, 
grants them a certain “tokenism” that breaks down disadvantages of a gendered legislative 
environment when representation is under 15% (Kanter 1977). For example, although the United 
States has not reached 30% in women’s congressional representation, American women have 
acquired the benefits of critical mass at only 15% occupancy in Congress because of their unique 
perspective as women. These women as individuals have made substantial progress in 
substantive representation by being critical actors, or those who act collectively or on their own 
accord to promote feminist policy change. Most notably, congresswomen who are critical actors 
not only have a shared identity as women, but also share the common trait of a “relatively low 
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threshold for political action: they may hold attitudes similar to those of other representatives, 
but they are much more motivated than others to initiate women-friendly policy reforms,” 
(Dahlerup 2006, 138). As introducers of these policies, they are thus viewed as authority figures 
on the subject of women’s interests, often increasing the chances of a bill’s acceptance by 
congressmen and the public. Having women act as tokens and critical actors “subjects legislative 
behavior to empirical investigation, promoting nuanced and more accurate accounts of how the 
substantive representation of women occurs,” (Dahlerup 2006, 139). Although American 
congresswomen have successfully used tokenism to spur policy change, the U.S. has historically 
been host to cyclical backlash. As demonstrated in my analysis, each age of women’s activism 
has signaled a responding wave of conservatism that sets back further advancement. Just as was 
the case in the Tortoise and the Hare, I investigate as to whether the U.S. is slow and steady in its 
journey to gender equality. 
Another component to the double bind is its depiction of traditional gender roles, which 
is engrained in congresswomen’s identity based on sex. Regarding gender stereotypes, men are 
judged by their physical strength as well as their logic and reasoning while women are evaluated 
by their attractiveness and creativity (Schneider & Bos 2014). For this reason, women’s positive 
stereotypes as being empathetic, warm people have affected their roles in political leadership, 
focusing on social welfare and local government positions within their community. However, 
“negative personality traits for women focus on emotional weakness, such as being whiny and 
spineless. For men, positive personality traits include agency-related traits of active and tough 
and negative personality traits include egotistical and greedy,” (Schneider & Bos 2014, 246). 
Whereas both men’s positive and negative stereotypes are leadership-oriented traits often 
characteristic of politicians, none of the traits designated to women (positive or negative) 
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coincide with traits of a good politician or any leadership role. To summarize, “female politicians 
are a subtype of women because they share little stereotype content, male politicians are a 
subgroup of men because of their overlapping traits,” (249). Although nations without quota 
laws are not any more or less democratic than other systems, non-quota women are likewise 
isolated because of the contrasting, superordinate stereotypes for female politicians as a 
disadvantaged subtype. This presents an obstacle for non-quota congresswomen, who do not 
have a legislative mandate to help them gain representation or overcome sexism. 
To demonstrate this, of the 18 characteristics denoted to most describe women (primarily 
beautiful, feminine, caring, compassionate, emotional, affectionate, etc.), very few overlap with 
traits used to describe female politicians (254). In fact, women politicians are trapped by the 
double bind wherein they are stereotyped as having the negative but dissimilar traits of both 
women and politicians, yet the positive characteristics of neither. For example, “adjectives 
related to integrity and empathy were chosen significantly more for women compared to their 
female politician counterparts, [yet] female politicians were [also] perceived to have twice as 
many ‘negative female leader traits’ than women,” which suggests that “female politicians are 
viewed as less equipped to handle a leadership role but also as possessing fewer womanly traits,” 
(259). 
 Regardless of quota laws, it seems all congresswomen are often characterized more by 
their shortfalls than by their strengths; they lack “leadership, competence and masculine” 
qualities because of their femininity yet are also criticized for lacking traits desirable for women 
(e.g., trustworthy, sensitive or compassionate) (250). As a result of this catch-22 faced by female 
politicians, non-quota women in Congress must balance the standard traits required of them. It is 
worth noting that the three “positive politician traits (ambitious, driven, and assertive) are also 
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traits used in the scale of negative female leaders,” (261). This is especially difficult when there 
is no positive outcome for them. As a result, congresswomen worldwide must collaborate on 
policies to gain support and substantial evidence that they as women are qualified policy-makers. 
This makes women communal and driven by shared goals and outcomes, whereas men are 
agentic and policy-driven because they have no need for community outreach and support for 
their sex.  
 Due to their different gendered obstacles, women cannot simply accomplish change 
through years of agency and experience as men do. Unable to simply rise through the ranks on 
their own volition, women rely on connections either from men in power or from women 
offering their support. Studies indicate that women are in fact more “similar than different from 
men in their backgrounds, paths to power, and political ambition,” however their roles are clearly 
defined by a legislator’s sex and therefore position in the gendered political hierarchy (Schwindt-
Bayer 2010, 2). This pattern in women’s climb up the political ladder carries over into their 
legislative behavior once elected. Rather than using men’s agentic lobbying and making strictly 
policy-based decisions, congresswomen have been shown to use communal means of promoting 
their policies and must cooperate with other women to strategically raise awareness for their 
causes… all within the boundaries set by their double bind.  
Quota Women, Maternalism, and Resentment of Paternalism  
 In fact, recent women’s frustration due to double bind has resulted in a staunch 
resentment of paternalism for certain politicians and in other cases a rise in women’s 
maternalism. Drs. Susan Franceschet and Jennifer Piscopo accredit this to the contrasting 
mandate and label effects. For example, while congresswomen in the United States struggle to 
strike a balance between suppressing their femininity and using it to discount their negative 
  30 
politician traits, the quota laws in Argentina “contribute to the perception that female 
representatives are needed because of their distinctly feminine perspectives,” (Franceschet & 
Piscopo 2008, 6).  
The Mandate Effect 
 Herein lies the important divergence between the mandate effect and the label effect. 
Under the mandate effect, women politicians see their role as representatives of women to be an 
obligatory platform for them to realize their feminist stance and advocate on behalf of their 
gender. As a result of the mandate effect, some politicians often opt for supporting maternalist 
policies, even further demonstrating how gender is a large part of their identity as well as their 
policy decisions. In contrast, the label effect is the result of public attitudes where male 
legislators and voters believe that quota women are ineffective or even undeserving of the 
position to change policy, regardless of whether that is true or not (Franceschet & Piscopo 2008, 
6). The phenomenon surrounding congresswomen’s labels as quota women or mujeres de in turn 
pressures these women to break their obligatory mandate. They see feminist activism as a 
reinforcement of their unjust label as ambassadors to only women, therefore they refuse to base 
their policies on women’s interests.   
Both arguments are true; female legislators face the paradox of being maternalist 
champions to women while also trying to not limit themselves as representatives of their gender 
and nothing more. Where quota laws were implemented as a stepping stone for feminist 
progress, nations’ commitment to quotas have yet to advance their overall modernity and 
promises for gender equality (Baldez 2004). For women who fall under the mandate effect, it is 
most common to adopt a maternalist agenda by basing their platform on “ideals of social 
harmony still championed [by] the well-ordered family, maintained by a nurturing mother” and 
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the elite holders of political power (Franceschet & Piscopo 2008, 7). As modern sexism and 
active chauvinism from male congressmen argue that quota women are simply mujeres de, 
maternalistic politicians believe that congresswomen “introduce a ‘politics of care,’” 
(Franceschet & Piscopo 2016, 24); thus these female politicians claim an ethical stance because 
according to them “women have a ‘woman’s way of doing politics,’ which is seen as less 
hierarchical and closer to the people,” (Marx, Borner, and Caminotti 2009, 62).  
The Label Effect 
On the other hand, many quota women contend that maternalism further diminishes their 
legitimacy by further engraining gender stereotypes into politics. These congresswomen support 
the label effect, claiming that their representation should not be a gender issue. According to 
them, the commitment to women’s progress becomes a matter of class and the elite’s obligation. 
It is then the job of the government to ensure women’s rights; it is not just a woman’s 
responsibility.  
Supporters of the label effect reject the use of quota laws as “bottom-up instances” for 
individual, domestic advocates to use feminist movements and coalitions to demand women’s 
representation. Instead, congresswomen under the label effect gravitate towards “top-down 
instances” in which “calculating political elites adopt quotas for publicity purposes, [although] 
the mechanisms are less likely to empower women,” (Franceschet & Piscopo 2016, 6). Seeing as 
this gives select female legislators the opportunity to focus on policies outside of women’s 
interests, female politicians oftentimes allow elites to believe that “historical leaps in women’s 
representation are necessary and possible” despite the failure of most fast-track movements for 
progress (Dahlerup & Freidenvall 2005, 29). 
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Resentment of Paternalism 
Considering quota laws as instantaneous policies for change, researchers argue that they 
“directly legislate equality, rather than allow non-discrimination policies to evolve overtime,” 
(Franceschet & Piscopo 2016, 8). The United States in contrast holds general resentment towards 
quota laws as they create backlash to feminist movements and deep trust issues with 
stateswomen. Rather, Americans assess that change should be gradual, not forced. According to 
one study, “trust in politicians and in parliament is higher in countries without quotas than in 
countries that have quotas,” (Zetterberg 2009, 721). In non-quota states where women must 
constantly make compromises in substantive representation, their resentment of paternalism has 
caused a system change sentiment. This means that both women and men are angered by the 
male, heteronormative nature of most politics and historic male abuse of political power. 
Frustrated and restricted by the status quo, a system change sentiment promotes further 
resentment and leads to a decline in women’s desire to participate in politics or attempt to gain 
power themselves as potential congresswomen (Tate 2014, 28).  
The mandate effect and label effect are key concepts that can incentivize congresswomen 
to participate in legislative behavior either as maternalist representatives of women or as 
legislators with no regards to gender. However, these theories can also reflect women’s 
discontent and even resentment of the political system, discouraging any improvements in 
women’s descriptive or substantive representation. In both quota and non-quota states, 
understanding these nuanced gender theories is crucial to analyzing the success of women’s 
representation in politics. 
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III 
Political History of Argentina 
 Argentina is known for its turbulent political history and has endured numerous coups 
and changes in government. Women’s history in Argentina is no different; their road towards 
feminist progress is just as winding and abrupt as the rest of the country’s history. Instead of a 
steady preparation for women’s inclusion into politics, improvements in Argentina’s gendered 
political system came through quotas and the expansion and acceptance of feminist statutes 
throughout times of chaos.  
 Historically, Argentine female legislators struggled with sexism and the double bind, 
particularly following their return to democracy in the 1980s. Having just been granted the right 
to vote in 1947, women’s involvement in public life and politics had been very brief. 
Furthermore, the oppression that men and women faced during the military junta in the 70s and 
80s left many people confused as to who should lead the government. Yet women did participate 
in rebuilding the country, and they have made significant strides in politics since 1983. As of last 
year, Argentina ranked 79th globally in percentage of women in upper and lower congressional 
houses, showing a 10.9 percent point increase in women’s representation (IPU 2015b). In 
comparison, the U.S. ranked 97th with an 8.4 percent point change (IPU 2015b). In this chapter, 
I have organized Argentina’s feminist history into six stages before and after the quota that 
outline the country’s greatest progress in women’s representation. I also included the obstacles 
congresswomen faced to further women’s political advancement during each period. 
Argentine Democracy Before the Quota 
i. Women’s Suffrage as a Stepping Stone to Democracy 
 Long before the quota law, even during Eva Peron’s activism and women’s suffrage 
movement, Argentine politicians did not acknowledge women’s diversity and professional 
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candidacy as a group. Prior to 1983, women activists embraced their engendered identity so that 
it would showcase their unique perspective and individual contribution to Argentina’s 
democratic future. Cecilia Grierson (Argentina’s comparative Susan B. Anthony), Eva Perón, 
and the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo are all examples of influential women who created the 
foundation for future feminists. However, their idea of feminism contradicted the West’s modern 
notion that women could act and think outside of their traditionally domestic, feminine role. In 
Argentina, these feminists “enfranchised women,” arguing that their conservative and virtuous 
nature would qualify them as good politicians and preventers of further corruption (Elsey 1641). 
Gender policies generally took on a “formalist and ‘neutral’ point of view, which made it 
impossible for the system to identify and respond to women’s concerns and needs,” (Carrio 
2012, 164). In response, women began to unionize and broadcast their positions through 
community programs, furthering the stereotype of female politicians and activists as mere civil 
servants. 
 The Argentine suffrage movement began in the 1920s as South America watched the 
United States and Western Europe grant women the right to vote. Although Argentina had not 
experienced the West’s slow development and feminist progress, Argentine women united via 
community outreach and charity work to promote their views for reform. However, before they 
were able to organize as a united group for suffrage, they required a new civil code that suited 
their mission for equality. In 1926, suffragists reformed the civil code to grant women better 
legal status as well as the right to work. Notwithstanding this accomplishment, their ideas did not 
appeal to those of working-class women who were disenchanted with feminist rhetoric. It was 
not until 1947 with the election of Juan (and Eva) Perón that the working class supported 
women’s advancement as they were granted the right to vote.  
  35 
 Eva Peron’s contribution to Argentina’s feminist movement was monumental in that it 
“mobilized working-class women in a way that suffrage groups [and political parties] could not,” 
(Elsey 1641). The Peróns heralded a new populist ideology and left a legacy that continues to 
impact Argentine politics today. Their narrative as idols of the poor has since become the 
template for modern Argentine politicians, who still seek to enchant voters with this Peronist 
image as guarantors for change. Through her class-focused activism, Eva revamped women’s 
political role as activists for social justice without addressing feminism or contradicting the 
traditional ideas of women as wives and mothers. The Peróns campaigned strictly on the virtues 
of social justice and economic reform, rarely advancing women for the sake of women’s rights. 
They focused on class divisions that would gain them support of the middle and lower classes, 
appealing to women by their social status rather than their gender. Women soon served as voters 
and politicians to promote the values and concerns of their class, not their sex.  
 Eva’s political activism was not what we today consider feminism. Her campaign against 
women’s autonomy and roles contradicts feminist thought, but it was successful because it 
complimented Argentine tradition. Peronism, despite attacking feminism when it did not 
coincide with their party’s agenda, did successfully broaden women’s role in politics. Eva Perón 
as an iconic woman and representative of her party “challenged the limits to women’s political 
participation. Her insistence that women subject their political goals to Peronism clashed with 
feminist views,” but it nonetheless got women to act as politicians outside of social work and 
community programs (Elsey 1641). Whereas the United States and many other nations showed a 
steady ramping up toward feminist change, Argentina used feminism and women’s suffrage as a 
tool to further the country’s overall progress.  
ii. Transition After the Junta 
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 Looking at a timeline, it’s evident that women’s suffrage and the passage of women’s 
interest bills in Argentina didn’t occur in a smooth progression. Just as Argentina faced a 
tumultuous path in structuring its democracy, Argentine feminists spent decades finding their 
political role as activists for women. Throughout the end of the military dictatorship, the public 
rallied behind the centrist social liberalist party UCR (Radical Civic Union) as the government 
battled an onslaught of repercussions. By 1983, Argentina had lost to the United Kingdom in the 
Falkland Wars and floundered as its 1982 economic recessions caused a 400% inflation and 
major debt crisis (Devlin 113). On December 10, 1983 the de facto president Ronaldo Bignone 
agreed to terminate the junta as a “democratic way out,” and UCR leader Raul Alfonsín was 
elected president (127). Following the overthrow of the military junta in 1983, feminists and 
politicians alike founded groups to organize their plans for a future democracy. Whereas activists 
had spent the last decades rallying against the junta’s oppression and numerous violations, they 
had not united over a cause they could fight for. By including feminist rhetoric in their 
campaigns for election, political parties sought to appeal to women as a group, regardless of their 
individual views and ideologies.  
iii. The Role of Women in Democratic Transition 
 Argentina had previously witnessed women’s solidarity and activism in the Madres de 
Plaza de Mayo, a group of mothers and grandmothers of those who disappeared and were killed 
at the hands of the military regime. Starting in 1977, their weekly protest in front of the 
presidential house Casa Rosada was an essential component to the junta’s downfall. Their 
bravery in showing public opposition demonstrated their power as women. Historically, 
Argentine women’s political role was limited to topics of community welfare and social 
injustice. Looking back on Eva Perón’s activism, women were allowed and even encouraged to 
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participate in politics as long as it coincided with their party’s platform and ideas of womanhood. 
They were restricted by the double-bind in which they could play the role of politicians as long 
as it did not downplay their identity as domestic women with traditional family values. However, 
the Madres demonstrated how women were just as affected by the government’s crimes and how 
women were just as qualified to respond with political action. 
 The country’s female legislators had struggled with finding their place for activism 
particularly following their return to democracy in the 1980s. The year 1984 was a landmark in 
Argentine women’s mobilization, wherein they united in solidarity as a targeted and oppressed 
majority, namely protesting as the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (Carrio 2012, 164). Without the 
Madres, the country would not have witnessed feminists’ ability to balance womanhood and 
political activism. Yet women have been unable to strike this balance as a result of male 
legislators’ inability to reconcile the amount of power they lose by yielding their positions to 
women. Feminist progress is still used as a promise made by politicians to benefit their personal 
career and their party’s advancement; women’s representation in politics is not a goal for male 
politicians, but a tool for their own achievement. As I present in my next chapter, it is 
noteworthy that the most headway in women’s interest occurred around election times where 
men campaigned for women’s rights to get women’s vote. The pattern continues even in today’s 
elections. Until male legislators in Argentina are able to recognize the democratic virtues and 
benefits of electing women, further feminist progress cannot occur. 
The Introduction of the Quota Law 
 The cupo de ley femenino was first introduced as a bill in 1989 and passed into legislation 
on November 6, 1991. In keeping with the quota classifications listed in the literature review, the 
Argentine quota is defined by these four traits: the quota’s mandate origin, how people seek 
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office to uphold the quota, when in the election process women are selected, and how they are 
elected. In Argentina, the quota law is structured as listed below: 
Mandate:  Legislative quotas 
Aspirants:  Primaries 
Candidates:  Candidate lists composed by party leaders 
Election:  Process of reserved seats selected by party 
 
 This quota design set by legislature explains the reason behind women’s progress in the 
Argentine Congress as well as their struggles to gain women’s representation. Critical actors 
such as Margarita Malharro and Carlos Menem also paved the way for feminist legislation, while 
also preparing the country for major movements and recent elections such as the presidential 
election of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner.  
i. Margarita Malharro and her Role in Implementing Quotas  
 Despite women’s political involvement throughout Argentina’s regimes and political 
turmoil, female legislators’ increase in substantive representation after the junta was met with 
some opposition prior to the quota. Legislator Margarita Malharro de Torres introduced the quota 
in November 1989, amending Article 60 of the constitution to incorporate the cupo femenino 
into party lists, but the bill didn’t pass until 1991 (Carrio 2012, 169). It was promoted by the 
Network of Feminist Politicians and female legislators from 15 different political parties. 
Unfortunately, women’s diversity and increase in awareness did not translate into policy change 
until it they acquired men’s support. For Congresswoman Malharro, she continued on to serve in 
legislature and gained the support of former president Carlos Menem in order to further advance 
women’s role in Argentine politics.  
ii. Carlos Menem and his Expansion of the Quota  
 Running on the Peronist platform of amending social injustices, Carlos Menem sought to 
appease the Argentine public with promises of reform and representation. Within a year of his 
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election in 1989, he sanctioned the quota bill, supporting its passage in 1991. His support for 
women in Congress then went unnoticed until his campaign for re-election in 1994, during which 
time he campaigned under a neoliberal, feminist platform focused on economic restructuring and 
extensively amended the constitution. Despite concentrating on other policies during his 
presidency, Menem’s emphasis on gaining women’s vote brought attention to the need for 
women’s representation in Congress. Through his support and introduction of the quota law, 
Menem brought about feminist progress in Argentina that had taken centuries to achieve in the 
United States and elsewhere. 
 In the same month of his re-election in 1995, Menem extended the quota law to the 
Senate. However, these interim periods are marked with conservative backlash and machismo. 
Throughout Latin America, governments’ return to democracy and neoliberal policies in the 
1990s cultivated an environment for women’s mobilization and activism. This in turn spurred 
conservative criticism and campaigns to reinforce gender roles into politics and emphasize 
Argentina’s identity as a catholic, family-oriented nation. In March of 1998, the non-profit 
organization Portal de Belén sued the National Ministry of Health to ban the production and 
distribution of emergency contraceptives. This court case was drawn out until 2002 when the 
Supreme Court sided with Portal de Belén, stating that the decision was in support of Argentine 
families and poor’s “noble” choice to maintain traditional household values (Piscopo 2011, 463).  
 Similarly, violence against women was a much debated issue that garnered years of 
proposals and heated legislative debates before passing any legislation. Law 24.417 in 1994 was 
against domestic violence but was broad and largely ineffectual, focusing on “protection against 
family violence,” (Ley No 24.417). It took fifteen more years before legislature addressed 
violence against women in its own bill. In 2009, Law 26.485 finally confronted femicide, which 
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as of 2012 still claims two lives every day in Argentina (Ley No 26.485). Either by blatant 
disapproval or by public inaction, women’s interest bills required years of work and amendments 
before becoming law in Argentina. 
Women and the Quota under the Kirchners  
 Argentina’s most prolific male champion for women’s advancement is Nestor Kirchner, 
who was elected president in 2003 with only 22% of the vote and served until his death in 2010 
(Walker 2011). Despite his unpopularity and election occurring during their largest economic 
crisis in recent history, he heralded a new age of stability and progress in Argentina. He even left 
behind a legacy promoting human rights (Maier 2010). His major accomplishments included 
appointing the first female Minister of Defense, Nilda Garre, and making reparations for all 
disappeared victims of the military junta, particularly their families and the Mothers of the Plaza 
de Mayo. By the end of his first term as president, Kirchner had increased women’s participation 
to 42 percent in Senate and 40 percent in the Chamber of Deputies, marking the first time in 
history that women’s representation had reached and sustained critical mass in both houses 
(Walker 2011). Nestor Kirchner’s administration was also the first to increase the amount of 
women in cabinet, wherein he appointed Nilda Garre as well as two other women to the heads of 
3 out of ten total ministries (Franceschet & Piscopo 2013, 90).  
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Figure 1 Source: Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson’s (2008) and the author’s (2016) calculations compiled 
from data received from the Ministerial Interior (http://mininterior.gov.ar/agn/pdf/libronacional.pdf). 
 
 Previously, women had seldom occupied the coveted executive positions that are valued 
for their “access to [financial] resources that fuel and sustain clientelism” as well as advance 
their individual careers (Franceschet & Piscopo 2013, 86). Previously working in ministries 
involving health or social development, women under Kirchner entered the economic and 
security sectors for the first time. In addition, women had rarely ever become governors or vice-
governors, nor had they worked at the provincial level. To this day, those positions that hold the 
most political power are run by “party bosses” who control a party’s finances and networking. 
Seeking to promote themselves and ensure the success of their own party, they also have the 
power to create and negotiate party lists, determining both candidate selection as well as their 
election and reelection upon becoming legislator (Franceschet & Piscopo 2013, 91). Yet by 
2005, women held 8.5 percent of these positions in municipal government, ensuring that more 
women would soon emerge into Argentina’s elite political networks (Franceschet & Piscopo 
2013, 90).   
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 In 2010, Nestor’s wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner succeeded him as president, 
unfortunately resulting in heavy backlash to having a woman seated in the most powerful 
position in government. Furthermore, accusations of corruption (such as the assassination of 
federal prosecutor Alberto Nisman) and other political scandals fostered even more criticism of 
her and indirectly other women in Congress. Incidents of negative responses to women have 
shown to “depress the political ambitions of other women… [who] said they were less likely to 
run after seeing how negatively [she] was treated by the media,” (IPU 2015).  
 Argentina has overcome many challenges following its return to democracy, particularly 
in its restructuring of legislature with the addition of the quota laws in 1991. In these past 
twenty-five years, much has changed in the way of women’s representation and even what 
Argentina identifies as feminism. This knowledge of political history and an understanding of the 
Argentine feminist perspective gained much insight into my research and the results of my study. 
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IV 
Political History of the United States 
 In the United States, women have slowly gained political access without the use of a 
constitutional quota or mandate. Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton played pivotal 
roles in igniting a national suffrage movement leading up to 1920, when women were granted the 
right to vote. For years, women slowly became increasingly involved in government. The first 
elected congresswoman to serve in the United States was Jeannette Rankin in 1916, although 
most women to first join congress were widows succeeding their congressmen husbands who 
had died in office. Most recently, EMILY’s List—a political action committee for pro-choice 
Democratic women—has been a tool for women to gain representation in a changing Congress. 
Before EMILY’s List 
Women’s Suffrage and the Role of Women after 1920 
 Beginning with women’s suffrage in the early 20th century, the first women to serve in 
Congress were the widowed wives of former congressmen who succeeded their husbands. 
Although women had been awarded the right to vote and at the same time had already been 
granted slim representation in Congress, the feminist movement was unable to make drastic, fast-
track strides in women’s representation. Most of the women in office before second-wave 
feminism never addressed women’s issues, but stood to continue their husbands’ legacies or 
distinguish themselves as women who excelled and focused on the same policies that men did 
(Lawless & Fox 2010). Descriptive representation, or any form of measuring women’s 
occupancy in Congress, was not discussed until much later during second-wave feminism in the 
early 1960s.  
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The Second-Wave Feminist Movement 
 As a group, women during the Second Wave demanded descriptive representation when 
women’s interests became part of the American political and even ideological platform. Issues 
such as reproductive rights and aid to single mothers became un-crystallized as political parties 
splintered into ideological subgroups. Due to the Civil Rights movement, the Vietnam War, and 
many other events, women and the American public began to question the political system. 
Specifically, women and minorities were stricken by the predominantly white, male government 
that did not properly represent their diverse nation. The few women in politics at that time had 
historically been depicted as married white women who served to continue America’s traditional 
gender roles.  
 However, the dilemmas of single motherhood were so neglected by previous 
administrations that second-wave feminists held a certain mistrust and lack of communication 
with the government regarding their gendered concerns. As a result, women’s representation in 
one party starkly contrasted that of another; women became marginalized into two very different 
groups: the suburban wife and mother, and the single woman (Lawless & Fox 2010, 31). It was 
not until the election of more women into Congress that descriptive representation translated into 
substantive representation, although its effectiveness is still debated today. In studying a timeline 
of women’s political progress in the United States, I am able to address the steady advancement 
of women’s interests via policy reform before and after EMILY’s List, the political action 
committee that changed policy reform for women.  
The 1980s: Reagan’s Resurgence of Conservatism and Feminist Backlash 
 The 1980s denoted a great shift both in politics and in feminism. During Ronald 
Reagan’s presidency, female activism heralded a new form of women’s representation via social 
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conservatism and the organization of the religious Right. Women’s representation in U.S. 
Congress did steadily increase, however only significantly after 1991. In fact, the era’s politics 
were characterized by a resurgence in conservatism supported by Christian family values and 
traditional gender roles that undermined women’s struggle for elected positions.  
 During the eight years that Ronald Reagan was president, not one woman was newly 
elected to the Senate, and the number of congresswomen in the House of Representatives rose by 
only two women. That is in contrast to much greater change in representation in the 1990s alone, 
when 32 congresswomen were newly elected (Schreiber 2012). Drs. Lawless and Fox accredit 
women’s lack of presence in Congress during the Reagan administration to the high incumbency 
for male legislators. Even today, over seventy-five percent of incumbents seek reelection and 
win office at rates higher than 90%. For women, the way to get one’s foot in the door was 
through open seats rather than the defeat of male incumbents (Lawless & Fox 2010, 30).  
 In keeping with traditional household standards, the Republican Party encouraged 
women’s political activism as Christian housewives and mothers seeking social progress. An 
example of this here on the timeline below was the Concerned Women for America (CWA), 
which aimed to limit reproductive rights and worked relentlessly with former President Reagan 
on a constitutional amendment to propose prayers in schools. The CWA served as a prime 
example of maternalism in American politics. In Argentina, they still engender politics with the 
theoretical underpinnings of maternalism and as a result unsuccessfully target fellow women and 
capitalize on their gender identity. 
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Much like Argentina, the United States in the 1980s also struggled with the benefits and 
consequences of maternalism in politics. The religious Right advocated for women to engage in 
politics as mother and wife activists, not as politicians. According to leading anti-feminists like 
Phyllis Schlafly, women held social power but not political power. Therefore, their activism and 
political participation was limited to a social platform where they served as members of a family, 
not a government. Women in this era campaigned and successfully stopped the Equal Rights Act, 
which would have made sex discrimination unconstitutional. They also heralded the 
politicization of reproductive rights as immoral, proposing to limit women’s access to healthcare 
and illegalize abortion. Ultimately, maternalism worked to create a feminine political identity 
that sustained existing hierarchies and reinforced “the cultural justifications for women’s 
oppression,” (Whittier 2006, 55).  
Challenging the CWA and other conservative movements, many female Democrats also 
began to emerge as leading politicians. 1984, despite a numerical lack of change in 
representation, also marked a shift in left-wing opposition and was the beginning for a new era of 
feminism. In 1984 the United States first used the term “glass ceiling” in regards to sex 
discrimination (Bollinger & O’Neill 2008, 9-10). It was also the year that the committee 
EMILY’s List was created to help pro-choice Democratic women fund campaigns and get 
elected to office. This was a major first step, along with Geraldine Ferraro’s candidacy for Vice 
President in that same year. As the first woman to ever run on a major party ticket in the general 
elections, Ferraro lost but successfully revealed to the American public the potential for female 
politicians. A woman could one day hold office as Vice President and (perhaps following this 
year’s elections) President of the United States. Lastly, in 1985 EMILY’s List was created and 
brought about a new method for women to enter politics and take Congress by storm.  
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Women’s Progress After EMILY’s List 
The Creation of EMILY’s List and its Immediate Impact 
 EMILY’s List, short for “Early Money Is Like Yeast,” was founded in 1985 at the home 
of Ellen Malcom, where 25 women met to discuss the obstacles that women faced to join 
Congress. The group’s mission was to form a network of donors to fund pro-choice Democratic 
women’s campaigns. Although many women at this time were qualified and seeking positions in 
government, pro-choice Democratic women were often not given the same attention and 
financial support throughout their campaigns. In the words of Malcolm, their founder, "women 
couldn't be equal until they had control over their bodies," (Malcolm & Unger, 68). For this 
reason, EMILY’s List sought to recruit pro-choice women and raise money for campaign funds 
so that they could run in the Democratic races. This was crucial because early money was like 
yeast: it made the dough rise. By the following year, the first elected female senator Barbara 
Mikulski was inspired by these women’s efforts and success in shining light on women’s 
political prowess, despite not yet winning party races. Pro-choice women and young Democrats 
alike made joint efforts in campaigning for their progressive policies. After twenty years, the 
organization cumulated the support of many politicians and congressmen. By 2008, EMILY’s 
List raised over $46 million dollars for candidates and successfully elected 12 women to the 
House of Representatives and two Senators (Malcolm & Unger, 38).  
1992: The Year of the Woman 
 Following the conservative wave during the Reagan administration, the U.S. witnessed a 
marked and drastic change in women’s representation with the 1990s. The number of women in 
both the House and the Senate steadily increased to where it is now at approximately twenty 
percent. Studies confirm that the period between 1989 and 2001 especially marked American 
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progress in substantive representation, both as a process and as an outcome. It is noted that 
women nearly doubled their number of seats in the House of Representatives in 1991 alone. In 
1992, women’s progress continued in new legislation and court cases that dubbed it “the Year of 
the Woman.” 
 The critical legislation spurring this characteristic progress of the 1990s were the 
Supreme Court Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Anita Hill case, and a chain of events in 1992. 
All of these incidents support the notion that the United States was experiencing its cyclical 
liberal period aimed at combatting the modern sexism and double bind that women faced in the 
eighties. The overarching theme of women’s interests court cases emerged as a result of 
women’s increased role in the workplace. Be it issues of sexual harassment (1991’s Clarence 
Thomas v. Anita Hill) or sex discrimination (1989’s Supreme Court Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins), the 1990s heralded a heightened awareness of gender inequality, both within and 
outside of politics. Despite the policy changes throughout history and various presidencies, 
women’s representation as professionals has only continued to rise at an equal rate between the 
House of Representatives and Senate despite facing sexism and backlash.  
As pro-choice Democratic women gained more access and influence in the workforce 
after the introduction of EMILY’s list, women as a whole increasingly noticed gender 
discrimination in both employment and their job application process.  Research depicts a clear 
pattern in which female workers entered jobs with much more experience than male co-workers 
in the same position. Women had also “held far more positions in their careers and had moved 
outside their initial industry many more times than their male counterparts,” because of women’s 
inability to obtain promotions at their initial place of employment (Fitzsimmons, Callan and 
Paulsen 2014, 250). Despite the inherently gendered nature of career advancement, both 
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politicians and institutions disregarded the problem, displaying their modern sexist view by 
denying the existing problem. This was made evident in the Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins where 
woman Ann Hopkins was continually denied her promotion to partnership with her firm as a 
result of her employer’s sex discrimination. Since the accounting firm failed to prove that she’d 
have been denied the promotion as a man, the infamous Supreme Court case demonstrated how 
women were being systematically denied leadership positions, portraying the obstacles and 
subtle discrimination they faced that had previously been ignored (252).  
 In attempt to ensure further women’s progress and men’s discipline and respect, some 
congresswomen resorted to “explicitly dominant behavior and emphasize[d] power differentials 
to impose their authority,” often displaying what is referred to as the bitch complex (Vial, 
Napier, and Brescoll 2016, 6). Unfortunately, as men often depicted this assertiveness as bossy 
or bitchy, these women’s tactics were substantially less effective in gaining respect and authority 
in the workplace. Furthermore, leading women in politics were more heavily chastened for being 
critical than their male colleagues. Following EMILY’s List, more women demanded respect and 
equality in politics and in their professions, addressing sexist backlash and discrimination head-
on. 
The most notorious of these cases was that of Anita Hill, an attorney for the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission who was sexually harassed by her boss and Supreme 
Court nominee Clarence Thomas. Vilified by the court and the media, Hill was portrayed not as a 
victim but as a manipulative woman working "in tandem with "slick lawyers" and interest groups 
bent on destroying Thomas' chances to join the court," (Time 1991). Other important elements of 
the case were that a) it was a highly televised event involving a black woman, and b) that she 
was subjected to an interrogation by an all white, all male jury that showed no sympathy or 
 
 
 52 
understanding of Hill’s dilemma. The case brought about for the first time a communal and 
legislative awareness of sexual harassment and male prejudice against women aiming to enter 
professional networks. It demonstrated clearly that, despite women’s presence and involvement 
in their careers and even Congress, women were still left to defend themselves against society’s 
and the court system’s modern sexism. 
This was the case in 1992; it was dubbed Year of the Woman because of a “redistribution 
of seats coincided with a major increase in women being nominated by the Democratic Party and 
the political drama of how Anita Hill’s testimony by a Senate committee made up exclusively of 
men,” (Bratton 2005, 62). As a result, women’s representation in the House of Representatives 
rose by 4.3%, exceeding 10 percent women’s occupancy for the first time in history (Bratton 
2005, 62). Nearly doubling in number of congresswomen, this dramatic increase in 
representation resulted in a lessened application of gendered behavior in Congress. Patricia 
Schroeder for example was known for addressing women’s interests on the floor, speaking on 
her experiences as a mother with miscarriages and the distribution of birth control. Her role 
expanded however when she ran on issues dealing with the U.S.’s involvement in Vietnam and 
other foreign policy issues. The overall increase in liberalism, particularly in 1992, championed 
women’s activism in light of numerous cases of injustice. By increasing women’s descriptive 
representation in the House and even substantive representation through publicized statutes, 
women were successfully able to confront the problems they’d silently faced for decades.  
Backlash and the War on Women 
Unfortunately, the feminist rhetoric that characterized legislation in the 1990s was short-
lived as a result of George W. Bush’s election in 2001. On his first day of office as president, the 
first law he sanctioned was to “re-impose a rule constituted by Ronald Reagan barring health 
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care providers receiving federal assistance from counseling women on abortion,” (Morelli 2015). 
Throughout his presidency, Bush consistently curtailed reproductive rights with his 2003 anti-
abortion ban which he then upheld in 2007. By diminishing the value of women’s health, he 
increasingly reinforced the conservative cycle started by Reagan. This was noted and protested 
by many, first in the March for Women’s Lives in 2004 as well as the Democratic Party’s 
campaigns against the Republican “war on women.” Since Reagan’s identifying women’s health 
as a political and ideological issue, parties increasingly diverged on feminist legislation. During 
George W. Bush’s presidency, there was a pattern of female legislators’ divided positions on 
women’s interests based on their party. Democratic congresswomen focusing on social issues 
geared toward women’s advancement, “while Republican women render women’s economic 
position, thus reflecting the ideological differences among their respective female constituents,” 
(Piscopo 2011, 453).  
Lastly, to further isolate women and limit their opportunities to close the gender gap, 
Bush also terminated the Equal Pay Matters Initiative, a federal policy enforcing preventative 
reviews on wage discrimination, particularly for women and minorities. This move allowed 
companies to violate equal pay regulations without facing any repercussions. Consequentially the 
nation witnessed 25-50% decrease in compliance reviews during President George W. Bush’s 
time in office (National Women’s Law Center 2004). 
2008-2016: Barack Obama’s Presidency 
 Obama was first elected with a historic 14-percentage point increase among female voters 
as well as a 20-point gap advantage over Republican candidate Mitt Romney in 2012, the largest 
voting gender gap since 1952 (Morelli 2015). On his first day of office, President Obama signed 
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act into law. As his first bill signed in office, it expanded upon the 
previously addressed wage gap and served to “lengthen the statute of limitations for 
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discriminatory pay claims” so that women could better seek reparation for wage discrimination  
(Morelli 2015). In addition, the bill successfully allowed employees to sue within an allotted 
time after the discrimination was first filed, not after the pay period. This is an important 
distinction because the employee might not have noticed that their paychecks were 
discriminatorily reduced (Morelli 2015). Throughout his presidency, Barack Obama sought to 
improve women’s rights, regardless of any controversies over a bill. For example, his Affordable 
Care Act, despite its criticism, did manage to provide healthcare to 8.7 more women and halt sex 
discrimination by insurance companies (National Women’s Law Center, 2004). 
The Obama administration also improved women’s representation within the political 
sphere, particularly with his White House Council on Women and Girls. With the goal to raise 
awareness on women’s welfare disadvantages due to a lack of political representation, the 
council was “the first of its kind to ensure all federal agencies account for the needs of women 
and girls in programs, policies, and legislation,” (Morelli 2015). It also furthered potential for 
future policies by installing programs to collect data on women’s and girls’ institutionalized 
exclusion from welfare. Women’s councils and increased involvement in the White House put 
responsibility on all policy makers and witnesses to sexism. For example, the ‘It’s On Us’ 
campaign and the reauthorization of the Violence against Women Act made politicians and the 
community alike accountable for crimes against women (Morelli 2015). Within the council, 
women also applied an “amplification” technique, wherein they used repetition to emphasize 
their points. When articulating an idea, they first referenced the woman author’s key point and 
accredited her to that idea’s introduction and validity. By repeatedly acknowledging other 
women’s contributions and building off of them in next actions, administrations could no longer 
ignore records of their female colleagues’ pertinent input and potential influence (Morelli 2015). 
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American history chronicled the stereotypical path to women’s success worldwide. In a 
society with no quota laws where women must pave their own way, feminist progress was met 
by grindingly slow and arduous efforts to emerge into politics and professional circles. By 
gradually breaking down barriers, it was assumed that women would steadily gain representation 
and equal status. My hypothesis in comparing the United States to Aesop’s tortoise aligned with 
that assumption and presented new information on the idea that slow and steady wins the race.  
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IV 
The United States and Argentina: A Case of Tortoise and the Hare 
 As previously stated, it was my hypothesis that the historical, political, and gendered 
circumstances surrounding the U.S. and Argentina created an environment comparable to 
Aesop’s “Tortoise and the Hare.” While I argued that the United States took a gradual and 
consistent route to improving women’s representation, I presumed that Argentina’s descriptive 
and substantive representation as a process would be fast tracked by the quota law but stunted as 
an outcome. Seeing as women in government must present themselves as active, positive roles in 
politics through descriptive representation, it was expected that in both cases their substantive 
representation should change in some form. This would either be by the number or type of bills 
produced, or by the amount of feminist legislation passed and effective policy changes that 
would positively effect women. I analyzed not just women’s operating presence, but also their 
political representation and impact as a group. In both countries, congresswomen are not simply 
representatives in numbers, but also in their “portrayals of constituents’ circumstances” and 
unique feminine voice (Piscopo 2011, 449). My hypothesis answered the question as to whether 
the tortoise or the hare in this case study would win the race to equality. 
Analysis of the Argentine Quota’s Progress  
Women in Legislature  
 A contended point regarding descriptive representation for women in Congress in terms 
of critical mass is the pressures amongst women competing for the same positions. By increasing 
the number of congresswomen in Argentina, there has been an “unintentional effect of the law… 
to foster competition among women,” (Marx 2009, 63). Whether legislators embrace or are 
forced to accept their identity as representatives of women, they nonetheless are compared with 
one another as not just politicians, but also as women. As women, they have a shared identity 
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that is shaped by their “exclusion from the political process and their collective status as political 
outsiders,” but also leaves them in a competitive position to break through gender bias (Baldez 
2004, 234). As more congresswomen emerge and contend for equal opportunities and 
representation as their male colleagues, they lose their advantage as unique tokens.  
 Tokenism in particular is a major obstacle for female legislators in Argentina. Seeing as it 
“focuses on the mechanisms that compel minority individuals to conform to role expectations 
based on group stereotypes,” it takes power away from the individual and places it with the 
group’s agenda (Childs & Krook 2009, 135). As previously stated, this does not benefit 
Argentine women that are from very diverse backgrounds and therefore hold very different 
political agendas and ideologies. Therefore, individual congresswomen may either emphasize 
their passion for women’s interests and lead the way for women or be drowned out as simply one 
of many women working under their party’s policies (Bratton 2005, 103). This is demonstrated 
in the great disparity in women’s interests bill proposals between men and women. Despite 
backlash, women were far more likely to speak out for women’s rights more than men.  
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Figure 2 Source: Franceschet and Piscopo’s (2008) calculations compiled from data received from the Dirección de 
Información Parlamentaria. The database is maintained by the Argentine Chamber of Deputies 
(http://www.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dip/qryproy2.html.)  
 
  
 Unfortunately, this does not improve women’s dynamic as a group or in competition with 
their male counterparts. To quote one congresswoman, “It is certainly true that the spaces that 
the men give us are so limited that we end up competing among ourselves… This is due to the 
fact that men give us so little room in a party structure which is still quite machista,” (Marx 
2009, 57). Legislators’ level of promotion of women’s interests as well as their party interests 
does not diminish the discrimination they face simply for being women. Ultimately, Cristina 
strived to confront sex discrimination in Argentina’s male-dominant political networks, but was 
unable to overpower the backlash resulting from her husband’s legacy and her own descriptive 
representation as president and sponsor for change (Jelin 2007, 4). 
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Women in Cabinet  
 Due to sex discrimination, male and female legislators in Argentina must network 
differently in order to promote themselves and secure an active role in sponsoring their political 
party. The most prominent difference is that men are agentic whereas women are communal. 
Men enter politics through their individual agendas and by creating a network of supporters who 
will assist in their climb up the political ladder, often having professional degrees (75% 
compared to just 34.5% of women), while women are more likely to have “come from the 
public, nonprofit, or education sectors and more likely to have participated in partisan or 
community organizations,” (Franceschet & Piscopo 2013, 94).  
 This is incredibly important given that party bosses are most easily contacted from within 
the elite executive network, not from their party’s outreach programs. In the rare case that 
women run for executive office, it is statistically shown that a close tie or non-political 
relationship with a party boss greatly increased the chances that she got elected (Marx & 
Caminotti 2009, 55). Party bosses, in addition to controlling candidate selection and in turn 
election, also determine a legislator’s reelection because of their elite status. Despite quota laws 
mandating women’s presence in politics, most of these power brokers are men with subnational 
executive experience. Women on the other hand cannot as easily obtain any executive posts 
despite their predominantly municipal or provincial legislative experience and greater 
educational credentials. Therefore, women struggle to not only become legislators but also to 
hold office. They consistently require more experience and connections in order to “compensate 
for the disadvantage of being female,” (Franceschet &Piscopo 2013, 89). Consequently, 
congresswomen are forced to be more aggressive rather than femininely passive in their lobbying 
and clientelistic networking. Whereas this assertiveness amongst women is criticized in the 
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United States as being bossy or “bitchy,” Argentines view this as having leadership skills that 
benefit the interests of the woman’s political party. Her personal advantage is coincidental (Vial, 
Napier, and Brescoll 2016). 
 For this reason, clientelism is a key component to a politician’s success. The logics of 
clientelism—exchanging goods, services or sponsorships to create a network or patronage and 
party support— center around the theme of promoting the political party before oneself. This 
structure is a consequence of the government’s budgetary system where it is illegal to provide 
public financing for political campaigns. As a result of this lack of funding, politicians resort to 
clientelistic activities instead. Again, these activities require membership in elite networks where 
politicians have the connections to lobby on behalf of their party. Seventy-seven percent of 
women in Argentina have never been given access to these clientelistic resources because of 
their exclusion from the executive branch and party power circles (Vial, Napier, and Brescoll 
2016). 
Women in Executive Positions  
 These political power brokers are predominantly governors, mayors, and ministers at the 
provincial level. The country’s dependency on clientelistic resources puts pressures on 
executives (specifically those at the provincial level) because “those elected and appointed 
offices receive and distribute federal monies to constituents,” (Vial, Napier, and Brescoll 2016, 
90). They distribute clientelistic funds and are also given the greatest opportunities to promote 
their party and their own career. These power circles are also in charge of candidate selection, 
which is structured top-down to provide party elite with the power to structure closed party list 
positions. This is significant for women, who are required to hold a third of the candidate 
positions but are systematically not given the number one or two posts. Because every third spot 
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must place a woman on the list, women are never placed first because they would then “have to 
appear [in the order of] 1st, 4th, 7th, and 10th (compared with the alternative sequences of 2nd, 
5th, and 8th or 3rd, 6th, and 9th). Parties may thus avoid nominating women as list-headers, 
because doing so imposes high costs on the rank-ordering of all candidates,” (Vial, Napier, and 
Brescoll 2016, 97).  
Analysis of the United States 
 Just as Argentina is a prime example of Latin American quota systems, the United States 
is a leading model of the benefits and pitfalls of non-quota states. It showcases that, despite 
lacking descriptive representation in comparison to Argentina, the US has made subtle gains in 
more substantial feminist progress. By delineating women’s representation into tiers (symbolic, 
descriptive, and substantive), Nélida Archenti broadens our understanding of congresswomen’s 
agency over time. Whereas previous literature summarizes descriptive and substantive 
representations as simply women’s presence and participation in office, Archenti as well as 
Piscopo portray a more profound theoretical structure for understanding sexism in Congress.  By 
analyzing the varying levels in representation as a complex network rather than a timeline, I 
examine The United States’ congressional progress in terms of American gender roles as well as 
congresswomen’s presence and behavior. 
Evolution of American Gender Roles 
 Although the United States does not operate under any quota law to fill seats in Congress, 
American politics do rely heavily on legislators’ gendered behavior traits to determine who is 
elected as political representative and leader of the community. An important aspect of the 
nation’s gender disparity is that we define men, and not women, as effective leaders. Proper 
leadership qualities are characterized by a politician’s “ability to influence a group of people 
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towards a common goal. However, the double bind serves as a “female politician paradox” 
because of women’s inability to express passion over any particular subject without appearing 
overly emotional or authoritative (Schneider & Bos 2014). Congresswomen may either showcase 
their identity as a woman (the “trait” approach), or repress their gender and self-identify first and 
foremost as a politician— the “belief” approach (Fitzsimmons 2014, 246). Confined by the 
double-bind and their limitations in behavior and gender roles, it seems that women legislators 
either recognize the diverging traits, or increasingly use it to their advantage as qualified 
individuals. 
Kanter argues that in order to avoid modern sexism in Congress, women legislators 
would use the belief approach. My research also confirms that congresswomen, rather than 
capitalizing on their tokenism by maintaining a low gender profile, women focus on a wide array 
of policies without avoiding topics of women’s interests. By broadening their substantive 
representation, these politicians could “blend unnoticeably into the predominant male culture,” 
and are viewed more as legislators than as ambassadors to women as one group (Kanter 1993). 
That is to say that in skewed groups where women represent under 15% of legislators, “tokens 
are often treated as representatives of their category, as symbols rather than individuals,” (Kanter 
1977, 966). Strengthened by their symbolic representation, American women act as ambassadors 
for their gender yet still must fear either role entrapment or backlash for not assuming the role as 
expert on womanhood. Unfortunately, this introduces a second double bind. In addition to 
balancing between their identities as women and politicians, congresswomen must additionally 
“work harder than men in order to be seen as competent but then face reprisals for their success,” 
(Bratton 2005, 101).  
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However, there is a benefit to women’s fight for legitimacy: increased awareness in 
women’s interests. Since they must all represent their entire group as women, female legislators 
are guaranteed to address women’s interests proposals more than their male counterparts, either 
because of their feminist perspective or due to the fact that they as women are meant to be 
ambassadors for their sex. My hypothesis also addressed this; I argued that women in US 
Congress were more likely to follow regular political agendas in comparison to those in 
Argentina who faced greater sexist opposition. What was not expected but was indicated in my 
research is that American women differ by party.  
Michele Swers in 2002 elaborated on this idea, showing that Republican congresswomen 
were more active in promoting women’s interests than their male colleagues, partially due to 
legislators’ expectations that they as women should be experts on the subject of women’s issues. 
Bratton provides strong evidence that “token women do not face relatively high obstacles at the 
passage stage of the legislative process,” (Bratton 2005, 113). In fact, they lose their advantage 
as numbers increase and men are more threatened by women’s heightened influence on 
policymaking. It is also acknowledged that women raise more awareness against sex 
discrimination and propose more legislation as the number of female legislators increases.  
Women in Legislature and Cabinet 
 In accordance with my previous discussion on women as a group, outward expressions of 
masculine dominance, anger, or intimidating tactics are all negative traits for women but are 
viewed as valuable leadership skills among men. An imbalance of masculine authority and 
feminine gentility in women could further engrain sexism by confirming “subordinates’ 
expectations that leadership roles are not suitable for women, and ultimately serve to further 
damage leader legitimacy by emphasizing power differentials, lowering subordinate’s respect 
 
 
 64 
and admiration for the leader, or both,” (Vial, Napier, and Brescoll, 7). For that reason, I 
analyzed female legislators’ concentration on policies both in and outside of gender as an active 
mission to prove women’s professional capability, but more importantly as a sign that women 
were more capable of breaking sexist barriers once in office.  
Methodology 
 I used and analyzed discursos and records from the White House and Casa Rosada as 
well as American and Argentine data recovered by the Inter-Parliamentary Union to track the 
descriptive as well as substantive representation of women in each Congress.  In addition to 
following members of Congress, I used government datasets to count the number of women in 
cabinet and leadership positions. My research assisted me in gauging political journals’ 
perception and assessment of female politicians as well as their depiction of each nation’s 
political history. By consulting IPU and manually counting the independent variables of a) the 
number of women in Congress, b) the number of women’s interests proposals, and c) the number 
and quality of positions they held, I was able to present new case study on the subject of 
women’s representation. 
Research Product 
Argentina 
As I previously hypothesized, my research shows that women’s representation in 
Argentina is not as stable as that of the United States. Whereas women’s descriptive and 
substantive representation in the United States is consistently improving, the Argentine number 
of congresswomen elected jumped from the “fast track” quota law but has slowed and even 
dropped since Cristina Kirchner’s presidency. Furthermore, these numbers led to a large increase 
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in women’s political activity, but not necessarily the passage of their bills or promotions to more 
influential positions in office.  
Evident in the graphs on the following page, the descriptive representation of 
congresswomen in the Chamber of Deputies peaked during Nestor Kirchner’s presidency in 
2007, only to decrease during Cristina’s administration. Seeing as their policies were extremely 
similar, it seems that legislators and voters’ opposition was to Cristina herself as a leading 
woman in office. This supports my theory that Argentina cannot truly progress any further until 
it recognizes its innately sexist tendency to support women’s interests only when beneficial to 
male party leaders. Under Argentina’s current quota design, which promotes change only when it 
is backed by critical male actors and events, progress cannot continue simply by reaching critical 
mass in the number of women’s seats.  
 Here in my research it is evident that, although women gained instantaneous access to 
congressional positions in 1991 and 2000, it did not cause an increase in feminist legislation. It 
did however allow congresswomen to propose and sponsor more bills, both on the subject of 
women’s rights and not. Below are graphs showing first women’s presence in Congress as well 
as comparative graphs depicting the stark difference between women’s participation and men’s 
in policy sponsorship. 
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Figure 3   Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from data received from Parline dataset. The database is 
maintained by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp).  
 
 Whereas the quota significantly improved the number of women in Congress, Argentine 
women still face the struggle of being incorporated into congressmen’s political circles and hard-
hitting policies. For this reason, women’s activity in the form of bill proposals is very different to 
that of male legislators. Unlike the United States, bill proposals in Argentina are presented to 
Congress after they are already voted on and approved by the sponsor’s party. These plenaries 
are almost always guaranteed to pass because they have already been supported by party leaders 
and voted on by each representative within that party.  “Given that party discipline is notoriously 
high, the outcome of the (positive) floor vote is typically known by legislators in advance,” thus 
making these plenary speeches more of an expert’s commentary in the form of a debate and not a 
persuasive proposal (Piscopo 2011, 456). This format allows sponsors to portray various 
perspectives and provide highly documented, ‘on the record’ insight for both Congress and the 
public. As such, plenary speeches serve as outlets through which legislators “perform those tasks 
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attributed to descriptive representatives: rendering information about constituents’ circumstances 
in politically relevant moments,” (Piscopo 2011, 456). The key to acquiring this power to spur 
awareness and policy change is thus to be considered a respected expert amongst one’s party and 
primarily one’s party leader. Therefore, legislators’ political networking and connections to party 
elite—not simply symbolic or descriptive representation—is imperative in securing 
congresswomen’s substantive representation.    
 
  
 
Figure 4   Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from data received from Parline dataset. The database is 
maintained by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp) 
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Figure 5   Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from data received from Parline dataset. The database is 
maintained by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp) 
 
 
Figure 6   Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from data received from Franceschet and Piscopo’s (2008) 
research and the Parline dataset. The database is maintained by the Inter-Parliamentary Union 
(http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp) 
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 This research indicates that, while Argentine congresswomen are active (thus improving 
substantive representation as a process), they are not equally represented in certain policy circles 
and therefore cannot properly impact representation as an outcome. An even greater disparity in 
women’s representation is noted in the Senate, where the quota was administered in 1995 but not 
reinforced until the year 2000 (Piscopo 2011). Two months following former president Fernando 
de la Rúa’s election to office, Decree No. 1,246 was passed to require quotas in candidate lists 
for re-election as well as for first-time candidate lists (Carrio 2012, 169). Women’s 
representation surpassed 35% for the first time in 2002, showing a decline from 2007 to 2009, 
potentially in response to the increase of women legislators in the lower house. 
  
Figure 7   Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from data received from Parline dataset. The database is 
maintained by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp). 
 
According to Franceschet and Piscopo’s 2008 research, women’s activity in legislature 
has drastically increased, although there has since been a stagnation in their approval by male 
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legislators in Congress as their resolutions are rarely passed (Piscopo 2011). As a result, all 
forms of representation hit a wall and are unable to progress. No matter how much women 
continue to voice their feminist plans for change, change is not being met. Evidently, substantive 
representation is an unrealistic standard that Argentina has set without building a feminist 
infrastructure to support the quota law. During Nestor Kirchner’s presidential term, the number 
of women senators soared from 5.7 percent to 37.1, however the election of a female president 
caused sexist backlash by men who felt threatened by women’s political influence (Franceschet 
& Piscopo 2013, 83). This is made evident by the graph shown below. 
Number of Senators 
 
Figure 8   Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from data received from Parline dataset. The database is 
maintained by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp) 
 
It also seems that the legislative progress towards gender equity is also being led by 
women. Of all the bills promoting gender quotas and proposing to increase the quota from thirty 
to fifty percent, women author 79% of the bills; they also author 73% of bills concerning sexual 
harassment, 69% of bills related to violence against women, and 80% of bills to improve 
women’s health and reproductive rights, such as the proposal to legalize abortion (Franceschet & 
Piscopo 2008, 10). Only when men are united as a progressive force in realizing feminist goals—
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when critical actors such as Nestor Kirchner are the standard for male legislators—can Argentina 
consider the possibility of true women’s representation. 
While clearly Argentine congresswomen’s substantive representation as process (the 
increase in women’s activity and bill introduction in congress) is improving, this seemingly has 
little impact on their substantive representation as outcome. As I previously mentioned, only 1 of 
the 67 gender quota laws passed and 2 of the 93 reproduction bills became law. Consequently, 
quotas in Argentina “do not appear to be associated with increased levels of political 
involvement among Latin American women” or the success of Argentine congresswomen’s 
involvement (Zetterberg 2009, 723). Although they are present and descriptively represented, 
women’s initiatives (although forcefully introduced) lack the backing of male politicians, 
therefore substantive representation succeeds as a process but most importantly fails as an 
outcome.   
Congresswomen in Argentina are becoming increasingly active in promoting feminist 
legislation, often considering social issues to be of a higher priority than congressmen (Swers 
2002). According to Swers’ research, women’s substantive representation during Nestor 
Kirchner’s first year as president, “women made up 64% of the leadership on these committees, 
and on the Family, Woman, Child and Adolescent committee, women provided the 
overwhelming voice with 77% of the seats,” (e.d. in Argentina Chamber of Deputies). Since 
2003, more women are promoting women’s interests and are successfully addressing issues that 
men previously would have neglected. However, women are marginalized in Congress by strictly 
focusing on these gendered concerns. Women’s way into politics in Argentina was through 
social reform and the promotion of women’s interests. However, there is no room for women’s 
expansion due to low incumbency rates and men’s seniority. Party leaders and incumbent 
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congressmen are often given priority over women whose only political background is on 
combatting gender equity. Thus, these women are sidelined and given marginal control over all 
policymaking. Combined with a low incumbency rate where women face cyclical and 
complicated political networks, Argentina still struggles to pass feminist legislation that does not 
benefit Congress’ more experienced, male majority.  
The United States 
 My research has confirmed the aforementioned hypotheses concerning American 
congresswomen’s growth rates in representation. Despite women’s universal exclusion from elite 
political networks and powerful positions in congressional councils, American women have 
more steadily acquired access and substantive representation compared to those in Argentina. 
Whereas Argentine female legislators have led the way in descriptive representation since the 
quota laws, they have failed to impact policy and men’s attitudes towards congresswomen. My 
research has also provided data that further explains characteristics about women in U.S. 
legislature that separate them from those in Argentina. Most notably, although women 
worldwide face sexism when applying for leadership positions in government, American 
congresswomen a) seek cross-policy positions on councils more than those in Argentina, and b) 
differ in feminist ideology largely based on their political views.  
i. Women in Legislature and Cabinet  
 Through my conducted research, I have shown that the amount of American 
congresswomen has steadily increased over time, thus confirming my “Tortoise and the Hare” 
hypothesis. Despite theories on backlash and tokenism against women’s congressional 
participation, female descriptive representation has improved in both congressional houses since 
the 1980s as shown in my graphs below. It has particularly risen in the Senate, despite the fact 
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that senators have power and more freedom than the House because they can participate in more 
diverse policy subjects and are more likely to serve on numerous committees. 
 
Figure 9   Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from data received from Parline dataset. The database is 
maintained by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp) 
 
Figure 10   Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from data received from Parline dataset. The database is 
maintained by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp) 
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 This shows that women’s presence has risen in both congressional houses, regardless of 
presidential term. Despite certain presidents’ policies or parties’ political views, women continue 
to be increasingly represented in government. In addition to descriptive representation, 
congresswomen’s participation and positioning on important committees has improved at a rate 
proportionate to the rising amount of total female legislators. Whereas in the 98th congressional 
term (1983-1985) women were not elected to any chairperson or ranking member’s position, 
women now occupy many leadership positions on Senate and House committees. 
Stereotypically, women had been designated to participating strictly in subjects concerning 
health care, education, women’s health, and other social positions. However, according to my 
data women currently fill 15.9% of all committee chairperson and ranking member seats in the 
House and 27.5% in the Senate. Furthermore, they represent on average 23% of subcommittee 
leaders in Congress across all committee arenas, from the Committee on Education and the 
Workforce to Homeland Security. 	
 This is particularly important because leadership and participation in congressional 
committees, particularly as chairperson or ranking member, provides women with much more 
access to policy change and affluent political networks. As the committee or subcommittee chair, 
legislators have the power to speak and lead committee discussions without waiting for 
acknowledgment. By having control over the committee’s agenda, they have extensive power 
over the success and delay of a bill’s passage (Manning, Brudnick, and Shogan 2015). Therefore, 
women’s election to these leadership positions greatly displays their participation in Congress 
and substantive representation in the form of policy change. The number of women’s committee 
leadership positions is consistent with the number of total women in Congress, hovering around 
twenty percent and consistently increasing every election. Even compared to the previous 2013 
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elections, women’s committee membership in the Senate increased by over five percent.  The 
only stark difference in congresswomen’s participation is not across congressional houses or 
even policy arenas, but based on political ideology. 
ii. Women’s Representation Based on Party Membership 
 My data, as well as coinciding with my previous assertions, also presented information 
on the divergence between Republican and Democrat women’s representation. Although women 
as a group have gained seats and important positions in Congress, there is a disparity between 
women in different parties. As previously stated in my historical analysis of women’s issues, 
Republican legislators have spent recent decades constraining feminist institutions and women’s 
policies whereas Democrats have recently facilitated generally feminist legislature. However, 
this was not always the case. As my research suggests, parties are more increasingly diverging in 
their election of women legislators. During the Reagan administration, the amount of Republican 
and Democrat congresswomen was fairly even, however as of 2016 an overwhelming 73.8% of 
female legislators were of the Democratic party (IPU 2016). 
 
Figure 11   Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from data received from GovTrack.us dataset. The 
database is maintained by the United States Congress House of Representatives and Senate 
(https://www.govtrack.us/congress/committees/ and https://www.congress.gov/committees)  
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 Argentina’s numbers in comparison are more evenly distributed due to the secular nature 
of party divisions. Legislators’ ideological positions on topics such as reproductive rights span 
across all party lines. In the United States, however, ideology is an important component to party 
division. Women as a group are mostly Democratic representatives. Additionally, Republican 
women make up only a small percentage of their party seats, whereas Democratic 
congresswomen occupy a third of their party seats. In comparison to Republican 
congresswomen, Democrat female legislators are abler to sponsor and cosponsor legislature as 
they are more representative of their party than Republican women who continue to only make 
up a small minority of the Republican party.  
 
 
Figure 12   Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from data received from GovTrack.us dataset. The 
database is maintained by the United States Congress House of Representatives and Senate 
(https://www.govtrack.us/congress/committees/ and https://www.congress.gov/committees) 
 
 This evidence is crucial to understanding the different battles congresswomen face in the 
US than in quota states. Whereas all parties in Argentina are legally required to include or at 
least nominate women, American political parties are able to build their candidate pools as they 
see fit. As gender became increasingly politicized during the Reagan administration and onward, 
 
 
 77 
the Republican party was not obligated to consider women’s interests by consulting or 
nominating female representatives. For years, the feminist perspective has been labeled as a 
liberal tool like EMILY’s List, and conservatives have chosen to dismiss it entirely. Even 
conservatives in Argentina, while against abortion and non-traditional gender roles, do not ignore 
women’s interests. Despite their issues with sexism, there is no political group or government 
that has tried to wipe women’s issues from political platforms, nor have they been accused of 
instigating a “war on women.” In seeing the disparity between Democratic and Republican 
women’s representation, it is clear as to how America’s progress is steady but arduous. It 
confirmed the theory for my case study as well as presented new topics for further research. 
Conclusion  
 To summarize, neither political system has successfully provided substantive evidence 
for the effectiveness of either the Argentina’s quota laws or the US’ lack of one. Although 
Argentina has reached critical mass as well as acquired critical actors such as Carlos Menem and 
the Kirchners, women are still blocked by the double bind and cultural opposition. Meanwhile, 
the United States’ congresswomen have acquired tokenism and are proportionally represented 
throughout all parts of Congress, the process is very hard for women to achieve. As a result, their 
representation has only peaked at around twenty percent in contrast to Argentina’s greater 
numbers. Gender quota laws have enhanced women’s presence in Congress, but according to my 
research have not resolved issues regarding women’s substantive representation. The quota has 
greatly increased the number of introduced bills on women’s interests but not the amount of 
those passed. This is not to say that Argentina has necessarily “lost the race.” Although 
representation in the United States is more consistent across the board, women’s issues are not as 
readily addressed. Furthermore, Argentina has accomplished far more in the way of women’s 
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interests than the US did in the same time period. In fact, women in Argentina do not feel the 
impulse to avoid backlash; rather, they confront it as a community, drawing on their identity as 
women and record of involvement as politicians. Specifically, their plenary speeches and activity 
on the congressional floor provide evidence that female legislators reinforce their substantive 
representation by increasing their activity regardless of any fear of backlash or the label of a 
“bitch complex” (Vial, Napier, and Brescoll 2016).  
 Effective representation in government has always been a struggle for women. 
Particularly in a legislature structured by a quota law of closed-party lists, congresswomen in 
Argentina are extremely disadvantaged when trying to occupy higher positions that require elite 
contacts and executive experience. Substantive representation specifically is not easily obtained 
when women’s high participation and proposals in government still cannot grant them passed 
laws or unity and success as a minority. However, one cannot deny Argentina’s innovative 
methods of promoting feminist legislation across all political parties, successfully de-politicizing 
gender in ways the United States has yet to achieve. Whereas Argentina over time is expected to 
culturally catch-up to the quota and concede to women’s interests, the United States faces its 
own potential stalemate if the Republican Party continues to not represent women. Eventually, 
Argentina must address its male opposition in order for female legislators—an already diverse, 
outspoken, and successful minority—may be treated with the same respect and recognition as 
their male colleagues. Similarly, in the United States, women cannot progress at a faster rate 
until party differences in women’s interests are recognized. In a world where sexism still hinders 
women’s livelihood and overall progress, there is no finish-line or winner in sight. 
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